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COMMENTS ON THE VIDMAR
AND DIAMOND STUDIES
Michael J. Saks*
One could not ask for two more different research approaches than
those represented by the articles of Neil Vidmar and his colleagues1
and Shari Diamond and her colleagues. 2
In the data constituting the Vidmar research, no two cases are the
same and only one jury decided each case.3 The Diamond data, on
the other hand, are developed from a single simulated trial that was
heard by a great many different decision-makers under systematically
varying conditions.4
Each study is one of the best of its genre. Although there are many
archival studies of civil jury verdicts, Vidmar's study is one of the most
methodologically careful in its efforts to avoid the errors of this
method, especially errors regarding misleading subtrahend estimates
that plague similar research searches for the amount of general dam-
ages awarded by juries. The Diamond research is, to my knowledge,
the best jury simulation study conducted to date, and therefore it
probably eliminates as many of the flaws in its research approach as it
is possible to eliminate.5
Both studies provide occasions for us to focus on key lessons about
the awarding of damages by juries. While Vidmar has gone a long
way toward solving one major problem of its genre, it leaves another
major problem untreated. Vidmar's data highlight the dramatic verti-
cal equity in awards: less serious injuries receive smaller awards and
more serious injuries evoke larger awards, both economic and gen-
* Edward F. Howrey Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, University of Iowa.
Ph.D., Ohio State University; M.S.L., Yale Law School. The author of this commentary is a co-
author of one of the works being commented upon.
1. Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of
Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265 (1999).
2. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of
Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301 (1999).
3. Vidmar et al., supra note 1, at 280-81.
4. Diamond et al., supra note 2, at 303-04.
5. Of course, it is tautological to observe that the flaws inherent in each approach cannot be
eliminated from that approach. Thus, the archival data are confounded and the simulation is not
an actual trial.
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eral.6 The study also follows the lead of others in noting what is inter-
preted to be considerable horizontal inequity: the notion that within
the same injury level, there is a great deal of unexplainable variation.7
Thus, we simultaneously have evidence of both predictability (vertical
equity) and unpredictability (horizontal inequity).
The latter finding, however, depends entirely on how we group
cases to be within the same injury levels. Vidmar's study, as did those
of his predecessors, used the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioner's ("NAIC") 9-point scale to rate the seriousness of cases.8
This approach has at least three shortcomings.
First, it uses only nine levels of seriousness.9 When thousands of
cases are grouped into a mere nine categories, each category has to
hold a great many cases, and those cases are not all alike; they merely
are treated as if they are alike. For example, under the NAIC scheme,
deafness and loss of one kidney are regarded as equal. 10 If we re-
searchers treat those two injuries as equal, but jurors distinguish be-
tween them, who is being more accurate? Our failure to capture their
distinctions is regarded as their inconsistency."
Second, the NAIC scale is unidimensional whereas injuries are
quite obviously multidimensional. Using merely a few of the concepts
of the law of compensatory damages, injuries can vary along such sep-
arate dimensions as physical pain, mental suffering, disfigurement, dis-
ability, and loss of enjoyment of life. Injuries may differ in terms of
whether they interfere with sensory or motor functions, with the phys-
ical or the mental, or with the way one looks or the way one sees.
Any Procrustean effort to take injuries that normally are understood
in several dimensions, and compress them into a single dimension for
the convenience of researchers or insurers, is bound to lose explana-
tory power. One study found that the NAIC scale could account for
only 44% of the variance in pain and suffering awards, compared to
multi-dimensional predictions of the same awards in the same cases,
which accounted for 74% of the variance.12
6. See Vidmar et al., supra note 1, at 293.
7. Id. at 269-70.
8. Id. at 281.
9. Id. at n.146.
10. NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, MALPRACrICE CLAIMS FINAL COMPILATION 48-66
(M. Sowka ed., 1980).
11. For a more sophisticated scale, see the one developed by David Baldus et al., Improving
Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative AdditurRemit-
titur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109,
1141-60 (1995).
12. Roselle L. Wissler et al., Explaining "Pain and Suffering" Awards: The Role of Injury
Characteristics and Fault Attributions, 21 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 181, 201-02 (1997)
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Third, even if one compared the awards made for injuries that were
absolutely identical, differences in those awards might still be both
explainable and proper. That is because the same injury can have
widely varying consequences for different plaintiffs. For example,
both may have lost their hearing in an accident, but there is a consid-
erable difference between a deaf musician and a deaf novelist.
In short, the variation in awards may not be unexplainable, but
merely unexplained. The shortcomings could as easily be those of us
researchers (poor measurement of injuries) rather than of jurors (poor
measurement of compensation). The less effectively we researchers
measure the injuries, the more "unpredictable" the awards seem to
be. Jury awards may, of course, suffer from considerable and undesir-
able horizontal inequity, but we cannot really know how much of that
there is until we researchers do our jobs better.
In the context of the Vidmar data, the Diamond study can be
viewed as an extreme case: With only a single stimulus case for all
jurors to react to, there is no opportunity to observe vertical equity.13
All variation is "horizontal." The opportunity to explain the variation
on the basis of individual differences among jurors (demographic, ex-
periential, attitudinal, etc.) is at its maximum. Diamond finds a
breathtaking lack of predictability in jurors' awards in this situation
with these data.
Is this unpredictability good or bad? I for one am not the least bit
troubled by the finding. Indeed, I am greatly comforted by it. That
there is little or no variation attributable to individual differences
among the jurors is highly desirable. It means that jurors are reacting
to the case, and not bringing their own biases to bear on the award to
be made in the case. If it held true generally, we could stop worrying
about biases and other differences among jurors, at least when it came
to awarding damages. Moreover, these findings suggest that there is
nothing but noise when a group of people all look at the same injury
in the same case and try to set a value on it.14 Is this not exactly how
we might hope the phenomenon would work?
These findings suggest, as Diamond notes, that the main task of im-
proving jury damage awards, especially general damages, is to reduce
the noise, and thereby stabilize the awards, making them more pre-
13. To be more precise, there were two versions of the same case, one with stronger and one
with weaker evidence. But the injury was identical in the two versions.
14. Presumably, were there a range of cases to react to, including a range of degrees of injury
seriousness, as in every other study of the matter, strong vertical equity would have been found.
See, e.g., Vidmar et al., supra note 1; Wissler et al., supra note 12.
1998]
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dictable. 15 That can be accomplished in several ways, from increasing
the size of juries16 to providing them with some meaningful guidance
in translating their perceptions of injury into dollar awards.17
Both studies can be seen to implicate problems of variability as cen-
tral to the challenge of understanding and managing jury awards of
general damages: To more accurately evaluate the quality of jury
awards, researchers and policy-makers need to measure injuries at
least as well as juries measure them. And for juries to more accu-
rately (predictably) assess the amount of damages, we need to develop
methods to reduce unwanted variability.
15. Diamond et al., supra note 2, at 317.
16. Michael J. Saks, The Smaller the Jury, the Greater the Unpredictability, 79 JUDICATURE
263, 263 (1996).
17. Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
243, 247-48 (1997).
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